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		<title>Brian Pennington</title>
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		<title>PCI Security Standards Council announces new board of advisors</title>
		<link>http://brianpennington.co.uk/2013/05/16/pci-security-standards-council-announces-new-board-of-advisors/</link>
		<comments>http://brianpennington.co.uk/2013/05/16/pci-security-standards-council-announces-new-board-of-advisors/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 11:51:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>brianfpennington</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[PCI DSS Compliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bob Russo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PayPal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PCI Security Standards Council]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PCI SSC]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[The PCI Security Standards Council (PCI SSC), announced election results for the 2013-2015 PCI SSC Board of Advisors. The Board will represent the PCI community by providing counsel to SSC leadership. The Council’s more than 690 Participating Organizations selected individuals from the following organizations to represent their industry’s unique perspectives in the development of PCI Standards [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=brianpennington.co.uk&#038;blog=19635128&#038;post=3417&#038;subd=brianfpennington&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The PCI Security Standards Council (PCI SSC), announced election results for the 2013-2015 PCI SSC Board of Advisors.</p>
<p>The Board will represent the PCI community by providing counsel to SSC leadership.</p>
<p>The Council’s more than 690 Participating Organizations selected individuals from the following organizations to represent their industry’s unique perspectives in the development of PCI Standards and other payment security initiatives:</p>
<ul>
<li>Bank of America N.A.</li>
<li>Bankalararasi Kart Merkezi</li>
<li>Barclaycard</li>
<li>British Airways PLC</li>
<li>Carlson</li>
<li>Cartes Bancaires Cielo S.A.</li>
<li>Cisco</li>
<li>Citigroup Inc.</li>
<li>European Payment Council AISBL</li>
<li>FedEx</li>
<li>First Bank of Nigeria</li>
<li>First Data Merchant Services</li>
<li>Global Payments Inc.</li>
<li>Ingenico</li>
<li>Micros</li>
<li>Middle East Payment Systems</li>
<li>PayPal Inc.</li>
<li>Retail Solutions Providers Association</li>
<li>RSA, The Security Division of EMC</li>
<li>Starbucks Coffee Company</li>
<li>VeriFone Inc.</li>
<li>Wal-Mart Stores, Inc</li>
<li>Woolworths Limited</li>
</ul>
<p>Board of Advisor members provide strategic and technical input to PCI SSC on specific areas of Council focus. Past board members have provided reach into key industry verticals and geographies to help raise awareness and adoption of PCI Standards; have shared their experience with implementing PCI Standards in presentations at the annual Community Meetings; and have contributed guidance on training product development and led Special Interest Groups (SIGs).</p>
<blockquote><p><strong>Active involvement from our Participating Organization base is critical to ensuring the PCI Standards remain at the front line for protection against threats to payment card data. Once again I am impressed by the turn out in the election process. It’s particularly encouraging to see new markets looking towards open global standards like the PCI Standards to help secure payment card data worldwide,” said Bob Russo, general manager, PCI Security Standards Council.</strong></p>
<p><strong>The Council and wider stakeholder community will benefit from the breadth of experiences and perspectives that this new board represents.” The board will support the Council’s mission to raise awareness and drive adoption of PCI Standards worldwide and will kick off its work in June with its first face-to-face meeting with Council management. “This year saw more European involvement than ever in the Board of Advisors election process. Although Europe contains mature EMV markets, this level of involvement in the PCI SSC confirms that the combination of PCI Standards and EMV chip is a powerful force for protecting payment card data,” said Jeremy King, European director, PCI Security Standards Council. “Our new board is a truly global group, and the Council will benefit greatly from its input as we continue to drive awareness and adoption of PCI Standards worldwide.</strong></p></blockquote>
<p>.</p>
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		<title>RSA’s April Online Fraud Report 2013, with a focus on the changes in Phishing tactics</title>
		<link>http://brianpennington.co.uk/2013/05/13/rsas-april-online-fraud-report-2013-with-a-focus-on-the-changes-in-phishing-tactics/</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2013 13:40:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>brianfpennington</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[brian pennington]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[email spam]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Phish]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[phishing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[RSA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[RSA Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Spearphishing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[trojan]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Phishing still stands as the top online threat impacting both consumers and the businesses that serve them online. In 2012, there was an average of over 37,000 phishing attacks each month identified by RSA. The impact of phishing on the global economy has been quite significant: RSA estimates that worldwide losses from phishing attacks cost [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=brianpennington.co.uk&#038;blog=19635128&#038;post=3406&#038;subd=brianfpennington&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p style="text-align:center;"><strong>Phishing still stands as the top online threat impacting both consumers and the businesses that serve them online.</strong></p>
<p>In 2012, there was an average of over 37,000 phishing attacks each month identified by RSA. The impact of phishing on the global economy has been quite significant: RSA estimates that worldwide losses from phishing attacks cost more than $1.5 billion in 2012, and had the potential to reach over $2 billion if the average uptime of phishing attacks had remained the same as 2011.</p>
<p>This monthly highlight goes beyond the growing numbers recorded for phishing attacks and looks deeper into the evolution of attack tactics facilitating the sustained increase witnessed over the last year.</p>
<p>Phishing kits recently analyzed by RSA show another phish tactic increasingly used by phishers. Although this is not entirely new, it is interesting to see it implemented by miscreants planning to evade email filtering security.</p>
<p>The scheme includes a number of redirections from one website to another. What kit authors typically do in such cases is exploit and take over one legitimate website, hijacking it but not making any changes to it. They will be using this site as a trampoline of sorts, making their victims reach it and then be bounced from there to a second hijacked website: the actual phishing page.</p>
<p>What good can this serve? Simple: the first site is purposely preserved as a “clean” site so that phishers can send it as an unreported/unblocked URL to their victims, inside emails that would not appear suspicious to security filtering. The recipient will then click the link, get to the first (good) URL and be instantly redirected to the malicious one.</p>
<p>Another similar example is reflected in time-delayed attacks again, not new, but increasingly used by attackers. This variation uses the same clean site, sends the email spam containing the “good” URL and stalls. The malicious content will only be loaded to the hijacked site a day or two later. These are often weekend attacks, where the spam is sent on a Sunday, clears the email systems, then the malicious content is available on Monday. The same scheme is used for spear phishing and Trojan infection campaigns.</p>
<p>Research into attack patterns proves that Fridays are a top choice for phishers to send targeted emails to employees spear phish Friday if you will. Why Friday? When it comes to phishing, phishers make it their business to know their targets as well as possible. It stands to reason that employees may be a little less on guard on the last day of the week, clean their inbox from the week’s emails and browse the Internet more making them more likely to check out a link they received via email that day.</p>
<p><a class="zem_slink" title="Typosquatting" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Typosquatting" target="_blank" rel="wikipedia">Typo squatting</a> is a common way for phishers to try and trick web users into believing they are looking at a legitimate URL and not a look-alike evil twin. The basics of typo squatting is registering a website for phishing, choosing a domain name that is either very similar to the original or visually misleading. The most common ways of doing this are: –Switching letters, as in bnak or bnk for “bank”, adding a letter at the end of the word or doubling in the wrong place, as in Montterrey for “Monterrey” – Swapping visually similar letters</p>
<p><a class="zem_slink" title="Phishing" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing" target="_blank" rel="wikipedia">Phishers</a> are creative and may use different schemes to typo squat. This phish tactic can be noticed by keen-eyed readers who actually pay close attention to the URL they are accessing, however, for more individuals on a busy day, typo squatting can end with an inadvertent click on the wrong link. This is especially important today, since fake websites look better than ever and are that much harder to tell apart.</p>
<p>A quick search engine search for domain iwltter.com immediately revealed that it was registered by someone in Shanghai and already reported for phishing.</p>
<p>But the notion plays against phishers in other aspects. Typos are one of the oldest tell-tale signs of phishing. You’d think that by now phishers would have learned that their spelling mistakes and clunky syntax impairs their success rates, but luckily, they haven’t. This could be in part due to the fact that many kit authors are not native English speakers Another phish tactic analyzed by RSA in the recent month came in the shape of a kit that selected its audience from a 3,000 strong pre-loaded list. It may sound like a long list, but is it very limiting in terms of exposure to the phishing attack itself. This case showed that phishers will use different ways to protect the existing campaign infrastructure they created and make sure strangers, as in security and phish trackers, keep out of their hijacked hostage sites while they gather credentials and ship them out to an entirely different location on the web.</p>
<p>Water-holing in the phishing context became a tactic employed by attackers looking to reach the more savvy breed of Internet users. Instead of trying to send an email to a security-aware individual, attempting to bypass security implemented in-house and reinventing the phish, water-holing is the simple maneuver of luring the victim out to the field and getting him there. A water-hole is thus a website or an online resource that is frequently visited by the target-audience. Compromise that one resource, and you’ve got them all. Clearly fully patched systems will still be rather immune and secured browsers that will not allow the download of any file without express permission from the user will deflect the malware.</p>
<p>Water-holing has been a tactic that managed to compromise users by using an exploit and infecting their machines with a RAT (remote administration tool). This is also the suspected method of infection of servers used for the handling of payment-processing data. Since regular browsing from such resources does not take place on daily basis, the other possibility of a relatively wide campaign is to infect them through a resource they do reach out to regularly.</p>
<p>Water-holing may require some resources for the initial compromise of the website that will reap the rewards later, but these balance out considering the attacker does not need to know the exact contacts/their email addresses/the type of content they will expect or suspect before going after the targeted organization.</p>
<p><strong>RSA&#8217;s Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>Although there is not much a phishing page can surprise with, one can’t forget that the actual page is just the attack’s façade. Behind the credential-collecting interface lay increasingly sophisticated kits that record user hits and coordinates, push them from one site to the next, lure them to infection points after robbing their information and always seeking the next best way to attack. According to recent RSA research into kits, changes in the code’s makeup and phish tactics come from intent learning of human behavior patterns by logging statistical information about users and then implementing that knowledge into future campaigns.</p>
<p><strong>Phishing Attacks per Month </strong></p>
<p>In January, RSA identified 30,151 attacks launched worldwide, a 2% increase in attack volume from December. Considering historical data, the overall trend in attack numbers in an annual view shows slightly lower attack volumes through the first quarter of the year.</p>
<p><strong>Number of Brands Attacked </strong></p>
<p>In January, 291 brands were targeted in phishing attacks, marking a 13% increase from December.</p>
<p><strong>US Bank Types Attacked</strong></p>
<p>U.S. nationwide banks continue to be the prime target for phishing campaigns – targeted by 70% of the total phishing volume in January. Regional banks’ attack volume remained steady at 15%, while attacks against credit unions increased by 9%.</p>
<p><strong>Top Countries by Attack Volume</strong></p>
<p>The U.S. was targeted by phishing most in January – with 57% of total phishing volume. The UK endured 10%, followed by India and Canada with 4% of attack volume respectively.</p>
<p><strong>Top Countries by Attacked Brands</strong></p>
<p>Brands in the U.S were most targeted in January; 30% of phishing attacks were targeting U.S. organizations followed by the UK that represented 11% of worldwide brands attacked by phishers. Other nations whose brands were most targeted include India, Australia, France and Brazil.</p>
<p><strong>Top Hosting Countries</strong></p>
<p>In January, the U.S. remained the top hosting country, accounting for 52% of global phishing attacks, followed by Canada, Germany, the UK and Colombia which together hosted about one-fifth of phishing attacks in January.</p>
<p><strong>See</strong> <strong>Previous 3 months of RSA Online Fraud Report Summaries:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>The RSA March 2013 Online Fraud Report Summary <a title="RSA's March Report" href="http://brianpennington.co.uk/2013/03/26/rsas-march-online-fraud-report-2013-with-a-focus-on-email-and-identity-takeover/" target="_blank">here</a>.</li>
<li>The RSA February 2013 Online Fraud Report Summary <a title="RSA's February Report" href="http://brianpennington.co.uk/2013/02/22/rsas-february-online-fraud-report-2013-including-an-update-on-phishing-activity/" target="_blank">here</a>.</li>
<li>The RSA January 2013 Online Fraud Report Summary <a title="RSA January 2013 Onlien Fraud Report" href="http://brianpennington.co.uk/2013/01/30/rsas-january-online-fraud-report-2013-including-an-excellent-summary-of-phishing-in-2012/" target="_blank">here</a>.</li>
</ul>
<p>.</p>
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		<title>PCI Security Standards Council publishes card production security requirements</title>
		<link>http://brianpennington.co.uk/2013/05/09/pci-security-standards-council-publishes-card-production-security-requirements/</link>
		<comments>http://brianpennington.co.uk/2013/05/09/pci-security-standards-council-publishes-card-production-security-requirements/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 09 May 2013 16:02:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>brianfpennington</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[PCI DSS Compliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bob Russo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Payment card industry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PCI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PCI Security Standards Council]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PCI SSC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[The PCI Security Standards Council (PCI SSC), has announced the publication of a standard for secure payment card production. The standard consists of two sets of requirements: PCI Card Production Physical Security Requirements PCI Card Production Logical Security Requirements Together, these documents provide card vendors with a comprehensive source of information describing the security requirements [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=brianpennington.co.uk&#038;blog=19635128&#038;post=3402&#038;subd=brianfpennington&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The <a title="PCI Resources" href="http://brianpennington.co.uk/pci-dss/" target="_blank">PCI Security Standards Council (PCI SSC)</a>, has announced the publication of a standard for secure payment card production.</p>
<p>The standard consists of two sets of requirements:</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>PCI Card Production Physical Security Requirements</strong></li>
<li><strong>PCI Card Production Logical Security Requirements</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>Together, these documents provide card vendors with a comprehensive source of information describing the security requirements to follow for card production activities including card manufacture, chip embedding, magnet-stripe encoding, embossing, card personalization, chip initialization, chip personalization.</p>
<p>Formerly managed as separate requirements by each payment card brand, the Council aligned these requirements and solicited feedback from the PCI community to produce one set of criteria recognized across the industry. The resulting standard is designed to secure the components and sensitive data involved in the production of payment cards and protect against the fraudulent use of card materials.</p>
<p>It’s broken down into two core areas:</p>
<ol>
<li><b>Physical security requirements </b>– for all card vendors, these requirements address the presence, movement, and accountability of a card, including tangible features such as the security of the premises, personnel access to secure areas, and CCTV surveillance.</li>
<li><b>Logical security requirements </b>– for card personalization vendors, these requirements address threats to the confidentiality of personalization data during data transfer, access, storage, and destruction; and all aspects associated with cryptographic key management, including the protection of issuer keys used in the personalization process.</li>
</ol>
<p>The security requirements are available for immediate download <a href="https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/documents.php" target="_blank">here</a>. Vendors should work with the individual card brands to confirm timing for when future security reviews must be performed against the new PCI Card Production Security Requirements.</p>
<p>In line with other PCI Standards, the requirements will be updated on a three-year lifecycle, based on feedback from the PCI community.</p>
<blockquote><p>There are a lot of pieces involved in securely producing payment cards, from design all the way through delivery,” said Bob Russo, general manager, PCI Security Standards Council. “The publication of these requirements gives card vendors one set of criteria to follow, and as we’ve seen with our other standards, will help drive improved security across the payments chain</p></blockquote>
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		<title>RSA’s March Online Fraud Report 2013, with a focus on Email and Identity takeover</title>
		<link>http://brianpennington.co.uk/2013/03/26/rsas-march-online-fraud-report-2013-with-a-focus-on-email-and-identity-takeover/</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 26 Mar 2013 09:40:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>brianfpennington</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[brian pennington]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Internet fraud]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Malware]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PayPal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[phishing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[RSA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[RSA Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Spearphishing]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[RSA’s March 2013 Online Fraud Report delivers the results from RSA’s fraud monitoring centre, a summary of the report is below. Phishing attacks are notorious for their potential harm to online banking and credit card users who may fall prey to phishers looking to steal information from them. Compromised credentials are then typically sold in [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=brianpennington.co.uk&#038;blog=19635128&#038;post=3387&#038;subd=brianfpennington&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a title="RSA" href="http://www.emc.com/domains/rsa/index.htm" target="_blank" rel="wikipedia">RSA</a>’s <strong>March 2013 <a class="zem_slink" title="Internet fraud" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_fraud" target="_blank" rel="wikipedia">Online Fraud</a> Report</strong> delivers the results from RSA’s fraud monitoring centre, a summary of the report is below.</p>
<p>Phishing attacks are notorious for their potential harm to online banking and credit card users who may fall prey to phishers looking to steal information from them. Compromised credentials are then typically sold in the underground or used for actual fraud attempts on that user’s bank/card account. Financial institutions have all too often been the most targeted vertical with phishers setting their sights on monetary gain, followed by online retailers and social networks.</p>
<p>Most understand the purpose of targeting financial institutions, but online retailers and social networking sites? Why would a fraudster target them? In most cases, they use an email address to authenticate their users’ identities, and they are not the only ones. Of course the user is made to choose a password when opening any new online account, but as research reveals, password reuse across multiple sites is a huge issue. A typical user reuses the same password an average of six times, or the same password to access six different accounts.</p>
<p><strong>Access Phishing campaigns have already been targeting webmail users for years now with campaigns purporting to be Hotmail, Yahoo!, Gmail, and the spear-phishing flavor in the shape of OWA (Outlook Web Access) for business users.</strong></p>
<p>Trojan operators followed suit and have not remained oblivious to the potential that lies in gaining control over victim identities through their email accounts. In fact, almost all Trojan configuration files contain triggers to webmail providers as well as to social networking sites. This is designed with the purpose of getting access in order to gain more information about potential victims in order to take over their online identities.</p>
<p>Since email accounts are an integral part of user identities online, they have also become the pivotal access point for many types of accounts. When it comes to online retailers and merchants, the email address is most often the username in the provider’s systems or databases. When it comes to bank accounts, the customer’s email is where communications and alerts are sent, and sometimes even serve as part of transaction verification.</p>
<p>Beyond the fact that email is part of customer identification and point of communication, the compromise of that account by a cybercriminal can have more detrimental effects. Email takeover may mean that a hostile third party will attempt, and sometimes succeed, to reset the user’s account information and password for more than one web resource, eventually gaining access to enough personal information to enable complete impersonation of the victim.</p>
<p>Although some webmail providers use two-factor authentication for account password resets (such as Gmail’s Authenticator), most don’t, thereby inadvertently making it simpler for criminals to access and sometimes attempt to reset access to accounts.</p>
<p>Fraudsters will typically probe the account for more information and sometimes lock it (by changing the password) in order to prevent the genuine user from reading alerts after a fraudulent transaction was processed on one of their accounts.</p>
<p>Since email is a convenient way for service providers to communicate with untold numbers of customers, online merchants will, in the name of ease of use, reset account credentials via email. Hence, if a cybercriminal is in control of the email account, they will also gain control over the user’s account with that merchant.</p>
<p>From there, the road to e-commerce fraud shortens considerably, either using that person’s financial information, or attaching a compromised credit card to that account without ever having to log into their bank account in order to access their money, and in that sense, email access equals money.</p>
<p>Another example is transportation companies, which are part of any online purchase and those who provide shipping service to companies as well as governmental offices. They also use email addresses as their users’ login identifiers and will reset the account via email.</p>
<p>A takeover of a user’s email account in this scenario will also mean takeover of that person’s/business’ service account with the transport provider. For fraudsters, this type of access translates into purchasing labels for their reshipping mules, charging shipments to accounts that don’t belong to them, and providing an easier route to reship stolen goods and even reroute existing orders.</p>
<p>Email account takeover may appear benign at first sight, but in fact it is an insidious threat to online banking users. The first issue with email account takeover (due to credentials theft or a password reset), is that users re-use passwords. When fraudsters steal a set of credentials, they will likely be able to use it to access additional accounts, sometimes even an online banking account.</p>
<p>The second issue is that fraudsters will use victim email access for reconnaissance with that person’s choice of financial services providers, bank account types, card statements (paperless reports delivered via email), recent online purchases, alert types received from the bank, contact lists (often including work-related addresses), social networking profile and more.</p>
<p>How Risky Is Email Account Takeover? Email account takeover can be a route to identity theft that only requires access to perhaps the least secure part of the online identity used by financial and other organizations and is perhaps one of the least evident elements that can become a potential facilitator of online fraud scenarios.</p>
<p>Email addresses can serve as a “glue” that binds many parts of a person’s online identity, connecting a number of different accounts that interlink. A typical online banking customer may use a Gmail address with their bank account, use that same address for a PayPal account, shop on eBay using that address, and receive their card statements at that address from their card issuer. All too often, that address is also their Facebook access email, where they have saved their phone number, stated where they work and for how long, and mentioned a few hobbies.</p>
<p><strong>RSA’s Summary</strong></p>
<p>Account hacks of this type happen all the time, and often make the headlines in the media. In some cases, there are a few hundred potential victims while in others, there are millions. The value of an email address to a cybercriminal should not be underestimated. This element of an online identity must be treated with added caution by all service providers that cater to consumers.</p>
<p>The line that crosses between ease of access and user experience always passes very close to security redlines, but sometimes very slight modifications in the weight customer email accounts can have on overall account access can turn a fraud attempt into a failed fraud attempt.</p>
<p><b>Phishing Attacks per Month</b></p>
<p>In February, RSA identified 27,463 phishing attacks launched worldwide, marking a 9% decrease from January. The overall trend in attack numbers when looking at it from an annual view shows slightly lower attack volumes through the first quarter of the year.</p>
<p><b>Number of Brands Attacked</b></p>
<p>In February, 257 brands were targeted in phishing attacks, marking a 12% decrease from January. Of the 257 targeted brands, 48% endured five attacks or less.</p>
<p><b>US Bank Types Attacked</b></p>
<p>U.S. nationwide bank brands were the prime target for phishing campaigns, with 69% of total phishing attacks, while regional banks saw an 8% increase in phishing attacks in February.</p>
<p><b>Top Countries by Attack Volume</b></p>
<p>The U.S. remained the country that suffered a majority of attack volume in February, absorbing 54% of the total phishing volume. The UK, Canada, India, and South Africa collectively absorbed about one-quarter of total phishing volume in February.</p>
<p><b>Top Countries by Attacked Brands</b></p>
<p>In February, U.S brands were targeted by 30% of phishing volume, continuing to remain the top country by attacked brands. Brands in Brazil, Italy, India, Australia, China and Canada were each respectively targeted by 4% of phishing volume.</p>
<p><b>Top Hosting Countries</b></p>
<p>In February, the U.S. hosted 44% of global phishing attacks (down 8%), while the UK and Germany each hosted 5% of attacks. Other top hosting countries in February included Canada, Russia, Brazil and Chile.</p>
<p><strong>See</strong> <strong>Previous 3 months of RSA Online Fraud Report Summaries:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>The RSA February 2013 Online Fraud Report Summary <a title="RSA'S February Online Fraud report" href="http://brianpennington.co.uk/2013/02/22/rsas-february-online-fraud-report-2013-including-an-update-on-phishing-activity/" target="_blank">here</a>.</li>
<li>The RSA January 2013 Online Fraud Report Summary <a title="RSA January 2013 Onlien Fraud Report" href="http://brianpennington.co.uk/2013/01/30/rsas-january-online-fraud-report-2013-including-an-excellent-summary-of-phishing-in-2012/" target="_blank">here</a>.</li>
<li>The RSA December 2012 Online Fraud Report Summary <a title="RSA Online Fraud Report December 2012" href="http://brianpennington.co.uk/2013/01/03/rsas-december-online-fraud-report-2012-including-an-excellent-piece-on-ransomware/" target="_blank">here</a>.</li>
</ul>
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		<title>Sometimes it is a good idea to have in-house skills</title>
		<link>http://brianpennington.co.uk/2013/03/20/sometimes-it-is-a-good-idea-to-have-in-house-skills/</link>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 20 Mar 2013 18:31:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>brianfpennington</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[PCI DSS Compliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ISA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PCI DSS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PCI SSC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[QSA]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://brianpennington.co.uk/?p=3369</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[After many discussions with people responsible for achieving and maintaining PCI DSS compliance within their organisation and hearing about their problems and pains, I often think about the skills they need and where they can get them. They could recruit, outsource or train with training being the most cost effective. I noticed on the PCI [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=brianpennington.co.uk&#038;blog=19635128&#038;post=3369&#038;subd=brianfpennington&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>After many discussions with people responsible for achieving and maintaining <a title="PCI RESOURCES" href="http://brianpennington.co.uk/pci-dss/" target="_blank">PCI DSS </a>compliance within their organisation and hearing about their problems and pains, I often think about the skills they need and where they can get them. They could recruit, outsource or train with training being the most cost effective.</p>
<p>I noticed on the PCI SSC website the details of their <strong>&#8220;PCI SSC Internal Security Assessor (ISA) Program&#8221;</strong> and the benefits it can deliver to large or complex merchants so I decided to promote it as a way of achieving some of the required in-house skills.</p>
<p>Knowing many highly skilled QSAs I would always say that their extensive knowledge of different scenarios and industries makes them the back-bone of the PCI DSS, not just from an audit perspective but their advisory and guidance skills.</p>
<p>The ISA programme gives candidates the opportunity to build their PCI Security Standards expertise and strengthen their approach to payment data security, as well as increase their efficiency in compliance with the PCI Data Security Standards.<b> </b></p>
<p><b>About the Training</b></p>
<p><b>Employee Education is the Best Defense for protecting your Organization’s Data Assets. </b></p>
<p>To address concerns about PCI compliance and card data security, the PCI Security Standards Council operates the Internal Security Assessor Program to assist firms seeking to educate their employees on PCI compliance regulations.  The program trains, tests, and certifies organizations and individuals to assess and validate adherence to PCI Security Standards.<b> </b></p>
<p><b>Who Should Attend?</b></p>
<p>ISA training is intended primarily for individuals who already possess significant relevant security audit and assessment experience (including but not limited to Network Security, Application Security and Consultancy, System Integration, and Auditing).<b> </b></p>
<p><b>The Benefits:</b></p>
<ul>
<li>Improve your understanding of PCI DSS and how it can help protect your customer data and your business</li>
<li>Help your organization build internal expertise</li>
<li>Facilitate interaction with a QSA for your organization</li>
<li>Enhance payment card data security and manage compliance costs</li>
<li>Earn CPE credits<b> </b></li>
</ul>
<p><b>The Format: </b>The Council recognizes that students may prefer different learning environments and offers <b>ISA training in two formats: Instructor-led (ILT) and online ELearning. Same content. Same qualification. You decide what’s best for you.</b><b> </b></p>
<p><b>The ISA Training Program</b>, for internal security assessment staff at ISA Sponsor Companies, is comprised of a four hour online pre-requisite course and exam called PCI Fundamentals followed by either an instructor-led course and exam or eLearning course and exam. Successful completion results in ISA qualification and PCI ISA certificate.<b> </b></p>
<p><b>Pre-Requisite Course Curriculum:</b> This portion of the training assures that all participants attending the ISA Training Course have the same baseline understanding of the PCI SSC, card data environment, and the related terminology along with the industry relationships within the credit card transaction flow. It concludes with a multiple choice test.</p>
<ul>
<li>Understanding the Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council and its role</li>
<li>Defining the processes involved in card processing</li>
<li>PCI roles and responsibilities</li>
<li>Understanding cardholder data</li>
<li>Defining network segmentation</li>
<li>PCI DSS assessments</li>
</ul>
<p><b>ISA Course Curriculum Covers:</b></p>
<p>The ISA course is the next step for those students who have successfully completed the pre-requisite PCI Fundamentals course. This course builds on the knowledge gained in PCI Fundamentals and delves into the actual PCI DSS requirements and testing procedures. In addition it addresses topics such Report on Compliance (ROC) documentation, QA ROC review, and compensating controls to name just a few. Also included in the instructor-led course are case studies that provide the ISA candidate with a simulation of assessment scenarios that may aid them in solving common problems found in their own environments. A multiple choice exam immediately follows the instructor-led course.  The exam may be conveniently scheduled at a Pearson VUE Testing Center for students that take the eLearning course.</p>
<ul>
<li>What is PCI and what does it mean to companies that must meet compliance with the DSS?
<ul>
<li>Industry overview</li>
<li>Terminology</li>
<li>Transaction data flow</li>
<li>Relationships between various organizations in the process</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>How the credit card brands differ in their validation and reporting requirements</li>
<li>PCI Data Security Standard (DSS)
<ul>
<li>Overview of 2.0</li>
<li>Testing procedures</li>
<li>What constitutes compliance</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>PCI Hardware and Communications Infrastructure</li>
<li>PCI Reporting</li>
<li>Real world examples
<ul>
<li>Overview of compliance issues and mitigation strategies</li>
<li>Compensating controls</li>
<li>Creating policies</li>
<li>Modifying cardholder data environment</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p><b>How to Register. Three Steps to Join as a Sponsor Company and Have your Employees Attend ISA training</b></p>
<p><b>Step 1 </b>Submit required Sponsor Company documentation by mail.</p>
<ol start="1">
<li>Original signed agreement, page 13 of the Validation Requirements document
<ul>
<li>The representative noted as your company primary contact should be prepared to receive all PCI SSC related communications</li>
<li>It is not required that your primary contact be an officer of your company</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Copy of your company business license (Articles of Incorporation are also acceptable)</li>
<li>A fully completed Individual Certification page for each employee you wish to send to training</li>
</ol>
<p><b>Step 2 </b>An invoice will be issued via email to the primary contact listed on the agreement page once the application is received. Applications are reviewed within 5 business days of receipt.</p>
<p>The fees for the ISA training will be based on whether or not your company is a member of the PCI SSC Participating Organization Program.</p>
<p>The Participating Organization Program is a <span style="text-decoration:underline;">separate program</span> and membership is not based on your company compliance to PCI DSS or the submission of the Sponsor Company documents outlined above.</p>
<p><b>Step 3 </b>Upon receipt of payment, the designated primary contact will receive instructions for the online pre-requisite portion of the training. Once the PCI Fundamentals training and test have been passed successfully, the primary contact will receive the location details for the instructor-led class or login credentials for the eLearning class. This will not be released until online PCI Fundamentals training has been taken and the test passed.</p>
<p><b>2013 ISA Training Course Schedule</b></p>
<table width="555" border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0">
<col width="111" />
<col width="153" />
<col width="50" />
<col width="121" />
<col width="120" />
<tbody>
<tr>
<td width="111" height="46"><strong>Date</strong></td>
<td width="153"><strong>Location</strong></td>
<td width="50"><strong>Time</strong></td>
<td style="text-align:center;" width="121"><strong>Participating   Organization Price</strong></td>
<td style="text-align:center;" width="120"><strong>Non-Participating   Organization Price</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="111" height="40">15-16 April</td>
<td width="153">London, UK</td>
<td width="50">09:00-17:30</td>
<td style="text-align:center;" width="121">$2250 USD</td>
<td style="text-align:center;" width="120">$3595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="111" height="40">3-4 May</td>
<td width="153">New Orleans, LA, USA</td>
<td width="50">09:00-17:30</td>
<td style="text-align:center;" width="121">$1495 USD</td>
<td style="text-align:center;" width="120">$2595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="111" height="40">20-21 May</td>
<td width="153">Denver, CO, USA</td>
<td width="50">09:00-17:30</td>
<td style="text-align:center;" width="121">$1495 USD</td>
<td style="text-align:center;" width="120">$2595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="111" height="40">10-11 June</td>
<td width="153">Orlando, FL, USA</td>
<td width="50">09:00-17:30</td>
<td style="text-align:center;" width="121">$1495 USD</td>
<td style="text-align:center;" width="120">$2595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="111" height="40">14-15 July</td>
<td width="153">Toronto, Canada</td>
<td width="50">09:00-17:30</td>
<td style="text-align:center;" width="121">$1495 USD</td>
<td style="text-align:center;" width="120">$2595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="111" height="40">21-22 August</td>
<td width="153">Boston, MA, USA</td>
<td width="50">09:00-17:30</td>
<td style="text-align:center;" width="121">$1495 USD</td>
<td style="text-align:center;" width="120">$2595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="111" height="40">22-23 September</td>
<td width="153">Las Vegas, NV, USA</td>
<td width="50">09:00-17:30</td>
<td style="text-align:center;" width="121">$1495 USD</td>
<td style="text-align:center;" width="120">$2595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="111" height="40">October</td>
<td width="153">Nice, France</td>
<td width="50">09:00-17:30</td>
<td style="text-align:center;" width="121">$2250 USD</td>
<td style="text-align:center;" width="120">$3595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="111" height="41">November</td>
<td width="153">Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia</td>
<td width="50">09:00-17:30</td>
<td style="text-align:center;" width="121">$1495 USD</td>
<td style="text-align:center;" width="120">$2595</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>Full details can be found <a title="PCI SSC" href="https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/training/isa_training.php#register" target="_blank">here</a>.</p>
<p>.</p>
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		<title>Merchant sues VISA.   Biting the hand that feeds you?</title>
		<link>http://brianpennington.co.uk/2013/03/18/merchant-sues-visa-biting-the-hand-that-feeds-you/</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Mar 2013 10:41:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>brianfpennington</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[PCI DSS Compliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Acquiring bank]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Credit Card]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Genesco]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[MasterCard]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PCI DSS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Visa]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://brianpennington.co.uk/?p=3352</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I know that if there were no merchants there would be no credit card companies and I know that the “alternative” payments market is growing, such as PayPal and V.me, but at this time it is fair to say that consumers still favour credit cards when it comes to online payments. This is why when I [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=brianpennington.co.uk&#038;blog=19635128&#038;post=3352&#038;subd=brianfpennington&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I know that if there were no merchants there would be no credit card companies and I know that the “alternative” payments market is growing, such as <a class="zem_slink" title="PayPal" href="http://paypal.com" target="_blank" rel="homepage">PayPal</a> and V.me, but at this time it is fair to say that consumers still favour credit cards when it comes to online payments.</p>
<p>This is why when I read about a merchant suing a credit card company I was surprised. Not surprised that <a class="zem_slink" title="Visa Inc." href="http://visa.com" target="_blank" rel="homepage">VISA</a> had fined a merchant, not surprised that a merchant was upset at being fined but surprised it had got to court because that means normal reasonable commercial communication channels had failed.</p>
<p>On the 7<sup>th</sup> March Sports retailer <a class="zem_slink" title="Genesco" href="http://genesco.com" target="_blank" rel="homepage">Genesco</a> filed a lawsuit against Visa to recover nearly $13.3 million in fines that the credit card company issued in January 2013 following a breach of the retailer&#8217;s systems.</p>
<p><strong>The lawsuit argues that</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Visa is not allowed to require other companies to pay penalties citing Visa&#8217;s own operating regulations and California law.</li>
<li>That Genesco was never out of compliance with <a title="PCI Resources" href="http://brianpennington.co.uk/pci-dss/" target="_blank">PCI DSS </a>regulations, and so it should not have been fined.</li>
</ul>
<p>In December 2010 Genesco confirmed that a breach had happened within its credit card processing environment and speculation at the time was the hackers used a packet sniffer to siphon card data as it passed through the network.</p>
<p>The initial VISA fines of $5,000 via each of Genesco’s two banks was issued in June 2011 which is a standard charge and depending on your location will be 5,000 of the local currency for example, $5,000, €5,000 or £5,000.</p>
<p>Irrespective of the currency 5,000 is nothing more than a formal acknowledgement that the merchant is non-compliant to PCI DSS or was at the time.</p>
<p>If a merchant has never successfully completed an Audit or Self Assessment Questionnaire (SAQ) then they are non-compliant, bearing in mind that the standards were issued almost 8 years ago I think it is about time they were compliant.</p>
<p>However, in the case of a merchant who was successfully audited but then had a breach or failed to maintain the standard it is not so black and white.</p>
<p><b>Merchant who suffers a Data Breach</b></p>
<p>A PCI DSS compliant merchant who has a data breach is normally discovered by clever algorithms used by the card schemes, which based on fraudulent activity find the centre of the breach. Once the merchant at the centre of the breach is established they are required to undertake data forensics by an approved forensic company who using extensive skills and tools will establish how the credit card data was stolen for example via packet sniffing. The forensic report is shared between the affected parties, the merchant, the bank and the credit card companies.</p>
<p>The results of the forensic investigation may or may not show that the merchant had or had not been compliant to the standard at the time of the breach. It is reasonable to assume that the bad guys installed software or broke into Genesco and almost all scenarios for such a break in are covered by the <a title="PCI Resources" href="http://brianpennington.co.uk/pci-dss/" target="_blank">PCI DSS </a>and therefore the company could not have been taking adequate steps and was by definition not adhering to the requirements of the standard which means they were not compliant.</p>
<p><b>Merchant who fails to maintain the standard</b></p>
<p>It is very difficult to find a merchant who has failed to maintain the required standards unless</p>
<ul>
<li>There is a breach</li>
<li>There is a whistle blower</li>
<li>A customer or someone similar notices practise that do not appear secure</li>
</ul>
<p>At this point the merchant will be required to prove there are still abiding by the standard which may take the form of a forensics investigation, an audit, a letter from their QSA or a letter from their directors.</p>
<p>The non-compliance fine is not the biggest problem for Genesco it is the $13.3 million fine levied by VISA via Genesco’s two banks (Wells Fargo $12 million and Fifth Third $1.3million) for the costs incurred by VISA whilst resolving the breach e.g. credit card replacement, fraud cover, etc.</p>
<blockquote><p><strong><i>Visa&#8217;s imposition of the (fines) is a violation of Visa&#8217;s contract (with the banks), because at the time of the intrusion and all other relevant times, Genesco was in compliance with the PCI-DSS requirements,&#8221; the lawsuit stated. It added later, </i></strong></p>
<p><strong><i>&#8220;Visa does not even pretend that the Non-Compliance Fines represent actual damages that Visa incurred by reason of the <a class="zem_slink" title="Acquiring bank" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acquiring_bank" target="_blank" rel="wikipedia">Acquiring Banks</a>&#8216; alleged failure to cause Genesco to maintain compliance with the PCI-DSS requirements&#8221;</i></strong></p></blockquote>
<p>The interesting thing for me is the nature of the way <a class="zem_slink" title="Merchant" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merchant" target="_blank" rel="wikipedia">Merchants</a> use VISA, <a class="zem_slink" title="MasterCard" href="http://www.mastercard.com" target="_blank" rel="homepage">MasterCard</a> and the other credit card providers. The credit card company provides the facilities for the merchant’s (retailer) customers to buy from them in a secure and efficient way. They pay a percentage of the transaction to cover the costs (and profits) of the credit card companies and this percentage is agreed in a contract. The same commercial contract that agrees the other terms and conditions including the security required to perform the transaction.</p>
<p>To avoid confusion and rogue traders the credit card companies created the <a class="zem_slink" title="Payment card industry" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Payment_card_industry" target="_blank" rel="wikipedia">Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council</a> who took the best security practises from the five credit card company members to create the Data Security Standard (<a title="PCI Resources" href="http://brianpennington.co.uk/pci-dss/" target="_blank">PCI DSS</a>).</p>
<p>This standard is an extension of the contract as will be the agreements for fees.</p>
<p>However because the cost of a data breach could never be known until it has occurred it is impossible to quantify the cost of a breach in a contract which is where I do have a great deal of sympathy for merchants because they are agreeing to fines but have no idea how much it is going to be or could be.</p>
<p>I remember in a meeting with several of the card companies and the discussion centred on repeat offenders i.e. merchants who kept being breached or who refused to become compliant to PCI DSS and whilst fines were mentioned it was agreed merchants might be tempted to absorb small fines if it was cheaper than achieving the required security standards and then the ultimate sanction was raised… <strong>STOPPING THEM FROM TAKING CREDIT CARD PAYMENTS</strong>.</p>
<p>What a sanction that is, because for almost all e-commerce business and most consumer driven business that would mean going out of business in a matter of weeks or possibly months.</p>
<p>As a consumer all I care about is being safe from the costs of the fraudulent activity against my stolen credit card but increasingly we as consumers are worried about the threat to our identity and expect when credit card details are leaked to be covered for all identity based threats resulting from the possible loss of data which increases the cost to the breached company, possibly via the credit card company.</p>
<p>I have a huge amount of sympathy for Genesco and every other merchant affected by a breach because they do not know what the possible cost to them will be. They cannot take out cyber-insurance against a specific amount “just in case”, they have to hope that the loss to the credit card company is not too great.</p>
<p>That is not a great way for a merchant to mitigate its risk and that cannot benefit the card companies who want prosperous and secure merchant to help them grow their profits.</p>
<p>The solution is simple, the credit card companies have to introduce and publish a schedule of fines from which a merchant can calculate their risk.</p>
<p>If a merchant knows, based on their transaction rate, that they could be liable for fines of $13.3 million then they can invest greater resources into breach prevention or seek to undertake insurance against the cost of a breach either way they can make an informed risk assessment.</p>
<p>Similarly if merchants who have not yet completed their PCI DSS compliance process know they could be fined for non-compliance PLUS X or Y for a breach they can will very quickly run a risk assessment.</p>
<p>let’s hope a result of this action is a clearer picture on fines because clarity in business and risk is essential.</p>
<p>.</p>
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		<title>Receptionist prosecuted for breaching the Data Protection Act</title>
		<link>http://brianpennington.co.uk/2013/03/12/receptionist-prosecuted-for-breaching-the-data-protection-act/</link>
		<comments>http://brianpennington.co.uk/2013/03/12/receptionist-prosecuted-for-breaching-the-data-protection-act/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 12 Mar 2013 20:38:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>brianfpennington</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[brian pennington]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Data Protection Act 1998]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hipaa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ico]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Personally identifiable information]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PII]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://brianpennington.co.uk/?p=3345</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Another nosy parker faces the results of their snooping after she decided to spy on her ex-husband’s new wife. The GP receptionist at a Southampton surgery was prosecuted by the UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) for unlawfully obtaining sensitive medical records. The ICO reported on the 12th March 2013 that Marcia Phillips was prosecuted under section [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=brianpennington.co.uk&#038;blog=19635128&#038;post=3345&#038;subd=brianfpennington&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Another nosy parker faces the results of their snooping after she decided to spy on her ex-husband’s new wife.</p>
<p>The GP receptionist at a Southampton surgery was prosecuted by the UK’s <a class="zem_slink" title="Information Commissioner's Office" href="http://www.ico.gov.uk/" target="_blank" rel="homepage">Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)</a> for unlawfully obtaining sensitive medical records.</p>
<p>The ICO reported on the 12th March 2013 that Marcia Phillips was prosecuted under section 55 of the Data Protection Act and fined £750 and ordered to pay a £15 victim surcharge and £400 prosecution costs.</p>
<p>Ms Phillips was found to have accessed the information on 15 separate occasions over a 16-month period while working as a receptionist at the Bath Lodge Practice. The breach became apparent after Phillips left her job and sent a text message to her ex-husband’s partner referring to highly sensitive medical information taken from her medical record.</p>
<p><strong>Deputy Commissioner and Director of Data Protection, David Smith, said:</strong></p>
<blockquote><p>This case clearly shows the distress that can be caused when an individual uses a position of responsibility to illegally access sensitive personal information. Ms Phillips knew she was breaking the law, but continued to do so in order to cause harm to her ex-husband’s new wife.</p>
<p>“The nature of her job meant that she will have been in no doubt as to the importance of patient confidentiality. Despite this she repeatedly accessed the victim’s file without a valid reason</p>
<p>Unlawfully obtaining or accessing personal data is a criminal offence under section 55 of the <a class="zem_slink" title="Data Protection Act 1998" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Protection_Act_1998" target="_blank" rel="wikipedia">Data Protection Act 1998</a>. The offence is punishable by way of a fine of up to £5,000 in a Magistrates Court or an unlimited fine in a Crown Court. The ICO continues to call for more effective deterrent sentences, including the threat of prison, to be available to the courts to stop the unlawful use of personal information.</p>
<p>David Smith added:</p>
<p>We continue to urge the Government to press ahead with the introduction of tougher penalties to enforce the Data Protection Act. Without these unscrupulous individuals will continue to break the law. Action to replace the section 55 &#8216;fine only&#8217; regime with an effective deterrent is long overdue. This change is not directed at the media and should not be held while <a class="zem_slink" title="Brian Leveson" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brian_Leveson" target="_blank" rel="wikipedia">Lord Justice Leveson</a>&#8216;s recommendations on data protection and the media are considered</p></blockquote>
<p>.</p>
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		<title>An update on the progress of the European Data Protection Act</title>
		<link>http://brianpennington.co.uk/2013/03/12/an-update-on-the-progress-of-the-european-data-protection-act/</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 12 Mar 2013 10:48:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>brianfpennington</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[brian pennington]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[data protection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Data Protection Act 1998]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[David Smith]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Commission]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Union]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Françoise Le Bail]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy by Design]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security by Design]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://brianpennington.co.uk/?p=3325</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[At last week’s Information Commissioners Data Protection Officers Conference in Manchester I had the privilege of being updated on the progress, or lack of progress, of the revised European Data Protection Act. With the existing directive dating back over 17 years an upgrade is well over due but there is significant pressure from businesses to [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=brianpennington.co.uk&#038;blog=19635128&#038;post=3325&#038;subd=brianfpennington&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>At last week’s Information Commissioners Data Protection Officers Conference in Manchester I had the privilege of being updated on the progress, or lack of progress, of the revised European Data Protection Act.</p>
<p>With the existing directive dating back over 17 years an upgrade is well over due but there is significant pressure from businesses to water down any revisions to the directive.</p>
<p>A watered down directive does not serve anyone, the privacy campaigners or those with commerce in mind, because breaches are happening far too often and breaches affect consumer confidence.</p>
<p>This means the larger retailers should be supporting stronger Data Protection controls so the smaller, less funded or less skilled businesses have the detailed controls and the incentives to put privacy and security first.</p>
<p>In the main hall and in the breakout room there was constant reference to the thinking about the issues before systems and processes are put in place. The two terms used were:-</p>
<ol>
<li><strong><a class="zem_slink" title="Privacy by Design" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privacy_by_Design" target="_blank" rel="wikipedia">Privacy by Design</a></strong></li>
<li><strong>Security by Design</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>Both Privacy by Design and Security by Design are essential for consumer confidence because they are demonstrable actions organisations can refer to when dealing with the users of their data.</p>
<p><a title="Francoise Le Bail" href="http://ec.europa.eu/justice/mission/director-general/index_en.htm" target="_blank">Françoise Le Bail</a> of the <a class="zem_slink" title="European Commission" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Commission" target="_blank" rel="wikipedia">EU Commission</a> stated that “23% of users feel they do not have complete control of their data when shopping online”. In other words almost a quarter of those who buy on line are suspicious of the people who want to take money from them. If those statistics were applied to bricks and mortar retailers the high street would look a lot worse than it does now and it already looks pretty bad.</p>
<p><strong>Françoise Le Bail also stated that the EC&#8217;s priorities for the Act are: -</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>The architecture of the framework</li>
<li>Key provisions to include all personal data and consent</li>
<li>A more risk based approach – proportionality</li>
<li>Data Protection Offices are needed</li>
<li>A consistent European wide level of governance</li>
<li>Support for authorities by providing training and not just fines</li>
</ul>
<p><strong><a title="David Smith Deputy IC" href="http://www.ico.gov.uk/about_us/our_organisation/management_board.aspx" target="_blank">David Smith</a> the UK Deputy Information Commissioner stated the UK was not 100% in favour of the current draft proposals but the UK was largely supportive.</strong></p>
<p>David Smith had a list of items that were favoured including:-</p>
<ul>
<li>Improved consistency across Europe</li>
<li>Enhanced Individual rights</li>
<li>Code of conduct and certification</li>
</ul>
<p>However, the UK is looking for additional items to be added and a clarification on others, for example:-</p>
<ul>
<li>The UK wants a more “risk” based approach to personal data</li>
<li>Individual compensation should not be restricted to monetary loss. It should also take into account aggravation and heartache.</li>
<li>Data Protection training needs to be added to the school curriculum</li>
<li>There are two proposals in place by the EU and the UK doesn’t want any more than that. The two proposals are Law Enforcement and everyone else.</li>
</ul>
<p>Other items of note</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>The date for the Act to be passed is likely to be June 2014 with enforcement two years later in 2016</strong></li>
<li>The 24 hour mandatory breach notification is likely to slip to 72 hours</li>
<li>The maximum 2% of global turnover is likely to be approved but some members of the commission are pushing for it to be 10%</li>
<li><a class="zem_slink" title="Do Not Track Policy" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Do_Not_Track_Policy" target="_blank" rel="wikipedia">Right to be forgotten</a> is a big problem due to the nature of what can be forgotten and what should never be forgotten</li>
<li>Data Portability is both a target for Europe and a problem and negotiations are on-going with the US and other nations on cross border data sharing.</li>
<li><a title="MiData" href="https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/midata-2012-review-and-consultation" target="_blank">MiData</a> now has 26 signed up companies and the drive for more is growing</li>
</ul>
<p>Other blog posts on the subject are below:-</p>
<ul>
<li><a title="EU Commission proposes a comprehensive reform of the Data Protection rules" href="http://brianpennington.co.uk/2013/01/30/eu-commission-proposes-a-comprehensive-reform-of-the-data-protection-rules/" target="_blank">EU Commission proposes a comprehensive reform of the Data Protection rules</a></li>
<li><a title="Proposed European wide Data Protection Act – a review" href="http://brianpennington.co.uk/2012/05/28/proposed-european-wide-data-protection-act-a-review/" target="_blank">Proposed European wide Data Protection Act – a review</a></li>
</ul>
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		<title>Lack of guidance on BYOD raises data protection concerns</title>
		<link>http://brianpennington.co.uk/2013/03/08/lack-of-guidance-on-byod-raises-data-protection-concerns-2/</link>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 08 Mar 2013 10:49:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>brianfpennington</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[brian pennington]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[BYOD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Data Protection Act]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ico]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Information Commissioner's Office]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[password]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PCI DSS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Personally identifiable information]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PII]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[YouGov]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[The UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has commissioned a survey into business attitudes towards Bring Your Own Device (BYOD). The survey results shown many employers appear to have a ‘laissez faire’ attitude to allowing staff to use their personal laptop, tablets or smartphone for at work and for work business, which may be placing people’s personal information [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=brianpennington.co.uk&#038;blog=19635128&#038;post=3316&#038;subd=brianfpennington&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The UK <a class="zem_slink" title="Information Commissioner's Office" href="http://www.ico.gov.uk/" target="_blank" rel="homepage">Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)</a> has commissioned a survey into business attitudes towards Bring Your Own Device (<strong>BYOD</strong>).</p>
<p>The survey results shown many employers appear to have a ‘laissez faire’ attitude to allowing staff to use their personal laptop, tablets or smartphone for at work and for work business, which may be placing people’s personal information at risk.</p>
<p>The survey, carried out by <a class="zem_slink" title="YouGov" href="http://www.yougov.com" target="_blank" rel="homepage">YouGov</a>, reveals that <strong>47% of all UK adults now use their personal smartphone, laptop or tablet computer for work purposes</strong>. But less than 3 in 10 who do so are provided with guidance on how their devices should be used in this capacity, raising worrying concerns that people may not understand how to look after the personal information accessed and stored on these devices.</p>
<p>Simon Rice, Group Manager (Technology), said:</p>
<blockquote><p>The rise of smartphones and tablet devices means that many of the common daily tasks we would have previously carried out on the office computer can now be worked on remotely. While these changes offer significant benefits to organisations, employers must have adequate controls in place to make sure this information is kept secure.</p>
<p>“The cost of introducing these controls can range from being relatively modest to quite significant, depending on the type of processing being considered, and might even be greater than the initial savings expected. Certainly the sum will pale into insignificance when you consider the reputational damage caused by a serious data breach. This is why organisations must act now.</p>
<p>“Our guidance aims to help organisations develop their own policies by highlighting the issues they must consider. For example, does the organisation know where personal data is being stored at any one time? Do they have measures in place to keep the information accurate and up-to-date? Is there a failsafe system so that the device can be wiped remotely if lost or stolen?</p></blockquote>
<p>Today’s guidance from the ICO explains how organisations need to be clear on the types of personal data that can be processed on personal devices and have remote locate and wipe facilities in place so the confidentiality of the data can be maintained in the event of a loss or theft.</p>
<p><strong>Key recommendations from the ICO’s guidance:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Be clear with staff about which types of personal data may be processed on personal devices and which may not</li>
<li>Use a strong password to secure your devices</li>
<li>Enable encryption to store data on the device securely</li>
<li>Ensure that access to the device is locked or data automaticaly deleted if an incorrect password is input too many times</li>
<li>Use public cloud-based sharing and public backup services, which you have not fully assessed, with extreme caution, if at all</li>
<li>Register devices with a remote locate and wipe facility to maintain confidentiality of the data in the event of a loss or theft</li>
</ul>
<p>The survey results below shows that email is the most common work activity carried out on a personal device (55%) which consider what information can be in the body of an email or attached leaves an organisations open to many commercial, legislative and regulatory risks for example <a title="PCI DSS Resources" href="http://brianpennington.co.uk/pci-dss/" target="_blank">PCI DSS </a>compliance.</p>
<table style="width:619px;height:242px;" width="619" border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td colspan="2" nowrap="nowrap" width="553"><b>All UK Adults online who use a smartphone, laptop or a tablet PC for work purposes access usage</b></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="327">Work email</td>
<td nowrap="nowrap" width="227">
<p align="center">55%</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="327">Accessing work files</td>
<td nowrap="nowrap" width="227">
<p align="center">35%</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="327">Storage   of work documents and work files</td>
<td nowrap="nowrap" width="227">
<p align="center">36%</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="327">Social networking (e.g. LinkedIn, Twitter, Facebook) for work</td>
<td nowrap="nowrap" width="227">
<p align="center">26%</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="327">Editing work documents</td>
<td nowrap="nowrap" width="227">
<p align="center">37%</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="327">Uploading   work information to a website</td>
<td nowrap="nowrap" width="227">
<p align="center">19%</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="327">Work video chat (e.g. skype etc.)</td>
<td nowrap="nowrap" width="227">
<p align="center">7%</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="327">Work related applications (Apps)</td>
<td nowrap="nowrap" width="227">
<p align="center">16%</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="327">Work related online banking</td>
<td nowrap="nowrap" width="227">
<p align="center">14%</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="327">Work related shopping</td>
<td nowrap="nowrap" width="227">
<p align="center">12%</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="327">Work related web browsing</td>
<td nowrap="nowrap" width="227">
<p align="center">35%</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="327">Other</td>
<td nowrap="nowrap" width="227">
<p align="center">22%</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="327">None of these</td>
<td nowrap="nowrap" width="227">
<p align="center">-</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>.</p>
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		<title>The growing threat of insider fraud not a top security priority for organizations</title>
		<link>http://brianpennington.co.uk/2013/03/01/the-growing-threat-of-insider-fraud-not-a-top-security-priority-for-organizations/</link>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 01 Mar 2013 12:59:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>brianfpennington</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[brian pennington]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Attachmate]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[BYOD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Data security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Enterprise Risk Management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fraud]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Larry Ponemon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ponemon Institute]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[An Attachmate sponsored Ponemon Survey indicates the growing threat of insider fraud is not a top security priority for organizations which is proving to be a costly mistake. On average, organisations experience approximately one fraud event per week, according to information from the second annual Attachmate and Ponemon Institute survey, &#8220;The Risk of Insider Fraud&#8220; However, only [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=brianpennington.co.uk&#038;blog=19635128&#038;post=3292&#038;subd=brianfpennington&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://brianfpennington.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/ponemon.png"><img class="alignright size-full wp-image-1917" alt="ponemon" src="http://brianfpennington.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/ponemon.png?w=620"   /></a>An <a class="zem_slink" title="Attachmate" href="http://www.attachmate.com" target="_blank" rel="homepage">Attachmate</a> sponsored Ponemon Survey indicates the <strong>growing threat of insider fraud is not a top security priority </strong>for organizations which is proving to be a costly mistake.</p>
<p>On average, organisations experience approximately <strong>one fraud event per week</strong>, according to information from the second annual Attachmate and <a class="zem_slink" title="Ponemon Institute" href="http://www.ponemon.org/" target="_blank" rel="homepage">Ponemon Institute</a> survey, &#8220;<strong>The Risk of Insider Fraud</strong>&#8220;</p>
<p>However, only 44% of respondents say their organisation views insider <a class="zem_slink" title="Fraud" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fraud" target="_blank" rel="wikipedia">fraud prevention</a> as a top security priority, a perception which has declined since 2011.</p>
<p style="text-align:center;"><strong>The average cost of a data breach in a 2011 study was $194 per lost or stolen record</strong></p>
<p style="text-align:left;"><strong>The survey reveals some alarming data security trends:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>On average, it takes 87 days to first recognize that insider fraud has occurred and more than three months (105 days) to get at the root cause of the fraud.</li>
<li>79% of respondents say that in their organization a privileged user has or is very likely to alter application controls to access or change sensitive information and then reset the controls.</li>
<li>73% of respondents, an employee&#8217;s malfeasance has caused financial loss and possibly brand damage.</li>
<li>81% say they already had an employee use someone else&#8217;s credentials to gain elevated rights or to bypass separation-of-duty control</li>
<li>48% of respondents say that BYOD has resulted in a significant increase in fraud risk</li>
<li>77% of respondents say the lack of security protocols over edge devices presents a significant security challenge and risk</li>
</ul>
<blockquote><p>This data demonstrates the invisibility of employee actions across an enterprise,&#8221; said Larry Ponemon, chairman and founder of Ponemon Institute. &#8220;While organizations may have policies and procedures to thwart insider fraud, it doesn&#8217;t mean employees will remain compliant, particularly with the rise of Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) practices</p>
<p>Data security and insider threats continue to be a challenge for organizations, particularly as BYOD brings complexity to <a class="zem_slink" title="Enterprise risk management" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enterprise_risk_management" target="_blank" rel="wikipedia">enterprise risk management</a>,&#8221; said Christine Meyers, director of Attachmate&#8217;s enterprise fraud management solutions. &#8220;Next-generation enterprise fraud management solutions, such as Attachmate Luminet, are able to correlate cross-channel activity, score risk and provide a screen-by-screen replay of what actually occurred. Add to that the proven deterrence factor that arises from being able to see and monitor use and abuse, and you can see why customers choose to deploy this technology for fraud detection</p></blockquote>
<p><strong>Fraud statistics</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>On average, organizations have had approximately 55 employee-related incidents of fraud in the past 12 months</li>
<li>More than one-third say that employees’ use of personally owned, mobile devices has resulted in malware and virus infections that infiltrated their corporate networks and enterprise systems and another 26% it is very likely to occur</li>
<li>61% rate the threat of insider risk within their organization as very high or high</li>
<li>23% say insider fraud incidents existed six months or longer before being discovered and 9% could not determine when they occurred.</li>
<li>55% of organizations say their organization does not have the ability/intelligence to determine if the off site employee’s non-compliance is due to negligence or fraud</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Threats from BYOD, Mobility &amp; Edge Devices</strong></p>
<p>For the first time the study asks questions about the effect <strong>Bring Your Own Device (BYOD),</strong> mobility and edge devices have on the risk of insider fraud. We define BYOD as the employees&#8217; use of their personally owned mobile devices (typically smart phones, tablets and laptops) for both work and non-work activities.</p>
<p>An edge device is a physical device that can pass packets between a legacy network (like an Ethernet network) and an ATM network, using data link layer and network layer information. An edge device does not have responsibility for gathering network routing information. It simply uses the routing information it finds in the network layer using the route distribution protocol. An edge router is an example of an edge device.</p>
<p><b>Edge devices and BYOD make it difficult to identify insider fraud</b></p>
<p>58% agree that BYOD makes it more difficult for the security or compliance department to have complete visibility of employees’ access and computing activities. The majority of respondents (78%) do not agree that employees’ access and possible misuse of edge devices is completely visible to the security or compliance department (100% &#8211; 32% of strongly agree/agree responses).</p>
<p>The study defined insider fraud as <strong><em>the malicious or criminal attacks perpetrated upon business or governmental organizations by employees, temporary employees and contractors</em></strong>. Typically, the objective of such attacks is the theft of financial or information assets, which include customer data, trade secrets and intellectual properties. Sometimes, the most dangerous insiders are those who possess strong IT skills or have access to an organization&#8217;s critical applications and data.</p>
<blockquote><p>With this research, we want to reiterate that organizations are not immune,&#8221; said Meyers. &#8220;The threat of insider fraud is a growing risk that can result in tangible financial loss to businesses. And the longer an organization takes to address it, the more costly it can become</p></blockquote>
<p>The insider fraud survey includes results from more than 700 individuals at leading global organisations.</p>
<p>.</p>
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